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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

LIZA VICTORIA CORWELL,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20020343-CA

:
INTRODUCTION

The trial judge's failure to inform Ms. Corwell of her constitutional rights require
withdrawal of her guilty plea. The State mistakenly asserts that this Court lacks
jurisdiction over this appeal. To the contrary, Ms. Corwellfileda timely amended notice
of appeal following the denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. The trial judge
erred in denying that motion because both the State and the trial judge concede that the
judge failed to strictly comply with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 11(e).
Further, Ms. Corwell never waived her challenge to the strict compliance requirement.
In fact, she specifically preserved her challenge to the validity of her guilty plea by filing
a timely motion to withdraw. The State would have this Court turn the strict compliance
doctrine into substantial or even non-compliance contrary to established law. Because
the trial judge never ensured that Ms. Corwell understood her rights to a speedy trial and
the limitations on the right to appeal, she unknowingly and involuntarily pleaded guilty.

ARGUMENT1
I.

MS. CORWELL VESTED JURISDICTION IN THIS
COURT BY FILING A TIMELY NOTICE OF APPEAL

Initially, the State asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because
Ms. Corwell failed to file an amended notice of appeal following the denial of her
motion to withdraw her guilty plea. State's Brief at 15-21. In contrast, the record reveals
that Ms. Corwell filed timely notices of appealfromboth the conviction and the order
denying her motion to withdraw. Specifically, the trial court entered a judgment of
conviction on March 29, 2002. R. 68-70. Ms. Corwell filed a timely notice of appeal on
April 26, 2002. R. 75.
On April 29, 2002, Ms. Corwellfileda timely motion in the trial court to vacate
her conviction and to withdraw her guilty plea. R. 84; State v. Ostler. 2001 UT 68, ^|10,
31 P.3d 528 (defendants have 30 days from entry of judgment to file motion to withdraw
guilty plea).2 In the meantime, this Court assumed jurisdiction over this case based on
the filing of the notice of appeal. On June 5,2002, Ms. Corwell requested this Court to
stay her appeal and to remand this matter to the trial court to resolve her motion to
'In her opening brief, Ms. Corwell claimed that the police lacked probable cause
and exigent circumstances to conduct a warrantless search. Opening Brief at 15-21. An
identical issue was raised in Ms. Corwell's co-defendant's appeal, State of Utah v.
Rebecca Champnevs. No. 20020123-CA. On March 27, 2003, this Court affirmed Ms.
Champneys' conviction and upheld the legality of the search. State v. Champneys. 2003
UT App 92 (memorandum decision).
2

Because the 30th day forfilingthe motion to withdraw her guilty plea fell on a
weekend, Ms. Corwell timelyfiledher motion on the following Monday, April 29, 2002.
2

withdraw her guilty plea. R. 158. This Court granted Ms. Corwell's request and ordered
her to inform this Court of the disposition of the motion and to file an amended notice of
appeal, if necessary. R. 156.
The trial judge entered a written order denying the motion on October 11, 2002.
R. 177. On October 28,2002, Ms. Corwell filed an amended notice of appeal which is
included in the record on appeal at pages 201-02. A copy of that notice is also attached
to Ms. Corwell's opening brief. Appellant's Brief: Addendum B. Because Ms. Corwell
filed a timely amended notice of appeal in compliance with this Court's explicit
directions, this Court has jurisdiction to review the denial of her motion to withdraw her
guilty plea. Utah R. App. Proc. 4(b); State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah
1987) (allowing for appeals from the denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea).

II.

BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO INFORM
MS. CORWELL OF HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
HE ERRED IN DENYING HER MOTION TO
WITHDRAW HER GUILTY PLEA

As the State concedes on appeal, the trial judge failed to inform Ms. Corwell of
her right to a speedy trial. State's Brief at 41-45. The judge further failed to explain the
limits that her guilty plea placed on her appeal rights. Under settled case law, these
failings prevented Ms. Corwell from knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty. The
State's contention that Ms. Corwell invited the trial judge's errors rings hollow because
she preserved her challenges to her guilty plea by filing a timely motion to withdraw her
3

plea. Ms. Cornell's lack of understanding of her rights to a speedy trial and to appeal
require the withdrawal of her guilty plea under any scenario that the State proposes.

A.

Ms. Corwell Unknowingly and Involuntarily
Waived Her Rights to a Speedy Trial

The trial judge failed to strictly comply with Rule 11(e) as required by Utah law.
State v. Abevta. 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993). Thus, the only question for this Court is
whether Ms. Corwell had sufficient understanding of her rights, independent of the trial
judge, to knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty. The record contains no indication that
Ms. Corwell understood her rights to a speedy trial when she pleaded guilty.
Accordingly, she did not knowingly and voluntarily waive that right.
The State concedes and the trial judge agreed below that the judge never informed
Ms. Corwell of her right to a speedy trial. State's Brief at 41-45; R. 182: 4. This Court
has unequivocally ruled that the omission of the right to a "speedy" trial in a plea
colloquy violates the strict compliance doctrine under Rule 11(e) and requires reversal.
State v. Hittle. 2002 UT App 134, ^|8, 47 P.3d 101; State v. Tarnawiecki. 2000 UT App
186, ^[18, 5 P.3d 1222. This failure violates the policy behind strict compliance to
"ensure that defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the basic
consequences of their decision to plead guilty" and to discourage post-conviction
challenges to the plea. State v. Visser. 2000 UT 88,1J11, 22 P.3d 1242; Gibbons. 740 at
1314.
4

Visser represents the only instance when any Utah appellate court has ever
excused requiring the trial judge to inform the defendant of the right to a speedy trial. In
that case, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the defendant understood this right
because he pleaded guilty during the middle of trial, after being afforded the right to a
speedy trial. Id. at ^]13. But, as this Court has ruled, Visser is limited to its specific facts.
That decision was premised on the facts that the "colloquy was given in a mid-trial
context and there was no indication that the trial had been delayed." State v. Dean, 2002
UT App 323, ^10 n.2, 57 P.3d 1106. Based on these circumstances, "the record in that
case reflected that Visser had been informed of his right[]" to a speedy trial. IdL
No similar conclusions can be drawn from the record in this case. The fact that
Ms. Corwell pleaded guilty on the Friday before her trial was scheduled to start the next
week shows that she understood her right to a trial but does not establish her knowledge
of the right to a speedy trial. Because the right to a speedy trial is "a distinct right" from
the right to a trial, judges must ensure that defendants understand that right before
waiving it. Hittle. 2002 UT App 134, ^[8, 47 P.3d 101. The trial judge failed to
determine Ms. Corwell's understanding here.
Visser also does not apply because Ms. Cornell's trial never began. That decision
rested on the fact that the defendant had actually received the right to a speedy trial.
Visser. 2000 UT 88, ^13, 22 P.3d 1242. But, here, Ms. Corwell never went to trial and
was not afforded that right. For this very reason, this Court found in Dean that the

5

defendant did not understand the right to a speedy trial. 2002 UT App 323, ^10 n.2, 57
P.3dll06.
The significant possibility that Ms. Corwell may not have proceeded to trial as
planned further undercuts assuming that she had knowledge of her speedy trial rights.
Even if she had gone to trial instead of pleading guilty, the record does not indicate
whether Ms. CorwelPs trial was scheduled as a first, second, or lower priority setting.
Trial courts commonly schedule multiple trials for the same day with the understanding
that not all cases will proceed to trial. Thus, the record is not clear whether Ms.
Corwell's trial would have actually been held as scheduled and that Ms. Corwell would
have been afforded her right to a speedy trial.
Moreover, the record includes no indication whether defense counsel was
prepared to proceed to trial. Had Ms. Corwell changed her mind and not pleaded guilty,
for example, defense counsel may have requested a continuance to ready himself for trial.
Moreover, the State's reliance on defense counsel's post-plea hearing statements at the
hearing on the motion to withdraw completely fail to address Ms. Corwell's
understanding at the time she entered her plea. State's Brief at 42. The record contains
no assurance that Ms. Corwell understood her speedy trial rights at the time she pleaded
guilty.
The numerous actual delays in this case are consistent with concluding that Ms.
Corwell lacked knowledge of her right to a speedy trial. The State charged Ms. Corwell

6

by Information on April 4,2001. R. 2. The case sat dormant for over three months until
June 14, 2001, when Ms. Corwell was presented in the trial court for a roll-call hearing.
R. 21. The preliminary hearing was scheduled for two months later, on August 14, 2001.
R. 35. The parties then litigated the motion to suppress. Ms. Corwell finally entered her
guilty plea on December 7, 2001, the same day the trial judge denied her suppression
motion. R. 53.
These delays communicated to Ms. Corwell that she had no assurance that her trial
would proceed as scheduled. Consistent with this conclusion, Ms. Corwell never
invoked her speedy trial rights. This Court cannot conclude based on this record that Ms.
Corwell had knowledge of her right to a speedy trial as could be done in Visser. Dean.
2002 UT App 323,1J10 n.2, 57 P.3d 1106.
Given the absence of evidence of Ms. Cornell's understanding, the State can
merely speculate that she knowingly and voluntarily waived her speedy trial rights. "If
the defendant is not fully informed of his [or her] rights prior to pleading guilty, then the
guilty plea cannot be voluntary." Hittle. 2002 UT App 134, ^[10, 47 P.3d 101. Should
this Court accept the State's speculative argument, this Court risks turning the strict
compliance doctrine into "substantial compliance" in violation of well-established
precedent. TarnawieckL 2000 UT App 186, ^|12, 5 P.3d 1222.

7

B.

The Trial Judge Failed to Inform Ms, Corwell
of the Limits to Her Rights on Appeal

Similarly, the trial judge failed to inform Ms. Corwell that "the right of appeal is
limited." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(8). The failure to inform guilty-pleading defendants of
their limited appeal rights violates the strict compliance doctrine and requires reversal.
State v. Ostler. 2000 UT App 28, ^16, 996 P.2d 1065. M[B]y pleading guilty, the
defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged
and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects." State v. Parsons. 781 P.2d 1275, 1278
(Utah 1989). "Thus, a knowing and voluntary guilty plea precludes reservation of issues
for appeal, even those concerning alleged pre-plea constitutional violations." State v.
Munson. 972 P.2d 418,421 (Utah 1998). Defendants may, however, specifically reserve
issues to be raised on appeal as was done in this case with the suppression issue. State v.
Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah 1988).
Although the trial judge informed Ms. Corwell that she had reserved the denial of
her suppression motion for appeal, he failed to mentioned that she was waiving all other
non-jurisdictional issues. Like the right to a trial, although Ms. Corwell may have known
of the one issue she had preserved for appeal, she did not understand the appeal rights
she had waived. Such issues include the right to contest the admissibility and quality of
the evidence, challenge the sufficiency of the State's evidence, and assert defenses.
Neither the plea affidavit nor the trial judge mentioned any of these rights.
The State would have this Court restrict the right to be informed of the limits on
8

appeal to guilty pleas specifically conditioned on the right to raise an issue on appeal.
State's Brief at 44-45. But, the State fails to support this contention with any relevant
authority or reasoning. Rather, it simply cites Gibbons and notes the subsequent addition
of this Rule 11(e) requirement without explaining how these facts support its argument.
The State's contention further fails to address the waiver of all other "nonjurisdictional
defects." Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1277. Without being "fully informed . . . prior to pleading
guilty" of the appeal rights that criminal defendants waive when entering a plea, Ms.
Corwell involuntarily pleaded guilty. Hittle. 2002 UT App 134,1J10, 47 P.3d 101; see.
also Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, ^16, 996 P.2d 1065.

C.

Ms. Corwell Preserved Her Challenges to The
Voluntariness of Her Guilty Plea When She
Filed Her Motion to Withdraw Her Plea

Contrary to the State's arguments, Utah law indisputably grants this Court
authority to review the voluntariness of Ms. Cornell's guilty plea. The only prerequisite
to challenging a guilty plea on appeal is the filing of a motion to withdraw the plea. The
trial judge has an affirmative duty to ensure the voluntariness of the plea and cannot
delegate this duty to defense counsel. Given the trial judge's obligation to determine the
voluntariness of guilty pleas, defense counsel cannot invite the trial judge to err. Rather,
the trial judge bears foil responsibility for unknowing and involuntary pleas.
Ms. Corwell preserved appellate review of her challenges to her guilty plea by
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filing a motion to withdraw her plea. To raise the voluntariness of a guilty plea on
appeal, criminal defendants must file a motion to withdraw the plea in the trial court.
State v. Reves. 2002 UT 13, Tf3, 40 P.3d 630; State v. Ostler. 2001 UT 68, ^10, 31 P.3d
528. Filing the motion gives trial judges an opportunity to address the validity of the
plea in the first instance. Dean, 2002 UT App 323,1J5, 57 P.3d 1106. This Court has
ruled that the filing of the motion itself is sufficient to preserve appellate review without
regard to the grounds specified in the motion. Id. at ^9. Ms. Corwell not only filed a
motion to withdraw her guilty plea but she specified her grounds for withdrawal. R. 84.
In doing so, she preserved appellate review of her guilty plea. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, ^3,
40 P.3d 630; Dean. 2002 UT App 323, ^5, 57 P.3d 1106.
The State argues that defense counsel invited the trial judge into erroneously
accepting Ms. Corwell's guilty plea. Specifically, the State contends that defense
counsel represented at the plea hearing that he had reviewed the plea affidavit with Ms.
Corwell, thereby implicitly vouching for the adequacy of the affidavit. State's Brief at
38-43. The State further faults defense counsel for stating at the hearing that he had
"nothing" to add to the trial judge's deficient plea colloquy. Id. According to the State,
counsel's conduct invited the judge to conclude that he had informed Ms. Corwell of all
of her rights.
Utah law specifically rejects the State's arguments. In Gibbons, the Utah Supreme
Court ruled that "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that
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constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is
entered." 740 P.2d at 1312. That Court concluded that trial judges cannot shirk this duty
by nassum[ing] that defense attorneys make sure that their clients fully understand the
contents of the [plea] affidavit." IcL. at 1313. Rather, the affidavit is "only the starting
point" for trial judges to determine the voluntariness of a guilty plea. IJL Neither defense
counsel nor the affidavit relieve trial judges of ensuring that "'no requirement of the rule
is omitted.5" Visser. 2000 UT 88, T[12, 22 P.3d 1242 (quoting State v. Maguire . 830 P.2d
216, 218 (Utah 1991) (decision on rehearing)). The State cannot shift the trial judge's
responsibility over guilty pleas to defense counsel.
Arguing further, the State explains the law on preserving challenges to jury
instructions and urges this Court to find an affirmative waiver of appellate review.
State's Brief at 39-40. But, the law on jury instructions differs significantly from the law
on guilty pleas. Utah appellate courts have only refused to review jury instructions when
defense counsel "consciously chose not to object... and then affirmatively" represented
the correctness of the jury instructions. State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah
1996); State v. Medina. 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987); State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d
1201, 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). This rule is designed to give trial judges the first
opportunity to resolve disputes and prevents counsel from consciously hoping to
"enhance the defendant's chances of acquittal" by planting error on appeal State v.
Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989), cert, denied 497 U.S. 1024 (1990). When these
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circumstances apply, defendants waive appellate review of jury instructions. See, e.g.,
Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1109.
In contrast, Utah appellate courts have specifically authorized review of guilty
pleas for plain error as long as criminal defendants file a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, T|3, 40 P.3d 630; Dean, 2002 UT App 323, ^5, 57 P.3d 1106.
Unlike the failure to object to jury instructions, the filing of a motion to withdraw
provides the trial judge an "opportunity to address" the adequacy of the plea colloquy.
Gibbons. 740 P.2d at 1312. In this case, Ms. Corwell not only filed a motion but also
raised the specific grounds for withdrawing her plea. R. 84. Her filing of the motion
eliminated any concerns for misleading the trial judge or planting error on appeal. Dean,
2002 UT App 323, %59 57 P.3d 1106.
Further, the appeal from the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea differs
significantly from appeals from a jury verdict. By requiring defendants to file a motion
to withdraw the plea, they appeal "'not from the conviction per se, but from the denial of
the motion.'" Dean. 2002 UT App 323, ^5, 57 P.3d 1106 (quoting Summers v. Cook .
759 P.2d 341, 342 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). The motion to withdraw is an independent
basis for appealing contrary to the jury instructions following a jury verdict. Allowing an
appeal from the denial of a motion to withdraw is logical because the presentence
investigation often "produce[s] information affecting the validity of the plea or the actual
guilt of the defendant." State v. Ostler. 2001 UT 68, ^|10, 31 P.3d 528. Because Ms.

12

Corwell filed a motion to withdraw, she preserved appellate review of the trial judge's
decision to deny her motion.
Even if Ms. Corwell had not preserved her challenges to her guilty plea, she did
not invite the trial judge to err. Although defense counsel stated that he had reviewed the
plea affidavit with Ms. Corwell, he did not "affirmatively11 vouch for its adequacy.
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109. Rather, defense counsel simply agreed that he had
"reviewed" the affidavit with Ms. Corwell, not that the affidavit contained all Rule 11(e)
requirements. R. 100: 4. Likewise, counsel's statement that he had "nothing" to add to
the trial judge's plea colloquy simply indicated that he was finished addressing the court
and did not constitute an affirmative endorsement of the trial judge's plea canvass.
Waiver doctrine only applies when counsel "manipulate^] the court" into committing
error. Robert J. Labrum, Comment, History and Application of the Plain Error Doctrine
in Utah. 2000 Utah L. Rev. 537, 550. Counsel must mislead the trial judge based on "a
consciously chosen strategy of trial counsel rather than an oversight." Bullock. 791 P.2d
at 158-59; see United States v. Olano. 507 U.S. 725, 733-34 (1993). Defense counsel's
claim that he had "nothing" to add, at most, amounts to an oversight of the trial judge's
failure to inform Ms. Corwell of the rights to a speedy trial and on appeal rather than a
strategic decision not to object.
Because Ms. Corwell never invited the trial judge to err, this Court can review the
trial judge's ruling for plain error. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, TJ3, 40 P.3d 630; Bullock. 791
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P.2d at 159. Under the plain error doctrine, this Court will find error when ff(i) an error
was made, (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (iii) the error was
harmful, so that in the absence of the error, a more favorable outcome was reasonably
likely." State v. HelmicL 2000 UT 70,1f9, 9 P.3d 164. As explained in subsections HA
and IIB, the trial judge erred in failing to inform Ms. Corwell of her right to a speedy
trial and her appeal rights. These errors were obvious because prior precedents clearly
established the strict compliance rule and specifically applied it to the errors raised in this
case. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, ^8, 47 P.3d 101; Ostler. 2000 UT App 28, TJ16, 996 P.2d
1065. Further, the failure to inform Ms. Corwell of these "substantial constitutional
right[s]ff presumptively harmed her. Hittle. 2002 UT App 134, ^9, 47 P.3d 101. Thus,
under any possible scenario, the trial judge erred in denying Ms. Cornell's motion to
withdraw her guilty plea.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Corwell requests this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of her motion to
withdraw her guilty plea.
SUBMITTED this ;g/"*day of April, 2003.

KENT R. HART
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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